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Abstract 
 
“Causal inference,” in 21st c CE epidemiology, has notably come to stand for a specific approach, one 
focused primarily on counterfactual and potential outcome reasoning, and using particular 
representations, such as directed acyclic graphs (DAGs) and Bayesian causal nets. In this essay, we 
suggest that, in epidemiology, no one causal approach should drive the questions asked or delimit what 
counts as useful evidence. Robust causal inference instead comprises a complex narrative, created by 
scientists appraising, from diverse perspectives, different strands of evidence produced by myriad 
methods. DAGs can of course be useful, but should not alone wag the causal tale. To make our case, we 
first address key conceptual issues, after which we offer several concrete examples illustrating how the 
newly favored methods, despite their strengths, can also: (a) limit who and what may be deemed a 
“cause,” thereby narrowing the scope of the field, and (b) lead to erroneous causal inference, especially if 
key biological and social assumptions about parameters are poorly conceived, thereby potentially causing 
harm. As an alternative, we propose that the field of epidemiology consider judicious use of the broad and 
flexible framework of “inference to the best explanation,” an approach perhaps best developed by Peter 
Lipton, a philosopher of science who frequently employed epidemiologically-relevant examples. This 
stance requires not only that we be open to being pluralists about both causation and evidence but that we 
also rise to the challenge of forging explanations that, in Lipton’s words, aspire to “scope, precision, 
mechanism, unification and simplicity.”  
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Key messages (3-5 bullet points) 
 
 Since the late 1990s, epidemiologic literature explicitly focused on causal inference, conceptually and 
methodologically, has burgeoned, with most of it employing counterfactual and potential outcome 
reasoning, to the point where the phrase “causal inference” is equated almost exclusively with 
“counterfactual causal inference,” with formal representation encoded in directed acyclic graphs (DAGs). 
 
 The 21st c CE epidemiologic emphasis on one approach to causal inference, however, stands in stark 
contrast to the equally recent explosion of literature on causal inference in philosophy and history of 
science, and also in diverse natural and social sciences, in which vibrant debates exist over types and 
processes of causal inference and explanation. 
 
 In this essay, using the examples of pellagra, the “birthweight” paradox, and racism and health, we 
instead suggest that a more promising approach for epidemiology would be to consider judicious use of 
the broad and flexible framework of “inference to the best explanation” (IBE), which, in the words of the 
philosopher Peter Lipton, aims to “think through inferential problems in causal rather than logical terms,” 
so as to reach what Lipton termed the  “loveliest,” and not just “likeliest,” explanation, one characterized 
by “scope, precision, mechanism, unification, and simplicity.” 
 
 Methodologically, to strengthen causal inference and explanation, we underscore the need for causal 
triangulation, whereby epidemiologists should employ diverse study designs, each involving different and 
unrelated potential biases, and test our hypotheses in different populations and in different historical 
periods, to see if results are robust to the confounding structures encountered and the analytic methods 
used. 
 
 DAGs and counterfactual approaches are but one set of conceptual tools that epidemiologists can 
employ, and should not occupy a privileged place in delimiting the kinds of questions we ask or causes 
we theorize. 
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 Causal inference. These two words, knit together, have come to new prominence in contemporary 
epidemiology [1-10]. Whereas prior to 1990 not one article in the Web of Science was indexed with a title 
or “topic” pertaining to “causal AND inference AND epidemiology,” as of the end of 2015, 558 such 
articles could be found, half of them published during or after 2010, with citations of these articles 
increasing exponentially (Figure 1)[11]. The stakes, after all, are high: riding on the findings of 
epidemiologic research are not only scientific credibility but also accountability and agency: who and 
what is shaping population distributions of health, disease, and well-being, within and across societies, 
and at what cost – and what benefit – to whom? [1,12-17]  
 Is it plausible to think, however, that epidemiologists did not concern themselves with inferring 
causation – and accountability – prior to 1990? Surely not. Insightful harbingers of today’s debates were 
incisively developed in the final lengthy chapter – “In Search of Causes” – of Jerry Morris’ classic 1957 
text “Uses of Epidemiology” [13] – and received book-length treatment in Mervyn Susser’s 1973 opus: 
“Causal Thinking in the Health Sciences” [14]. Disputes about elucidating causation likewise can be 
found in the epidemiologic literature of mid-20th c CE, e.g. in debates over tobacco [18-23], as well as in 
the mid-19th c CE, part and parcel of the emergence of population sciences [17,24-29]. 
 In the epidemiology of the 21st c CE, however, “causal inference” is increasingly equated with 
one specific approach, which focuses primarily on counterfactual and potential outcome reasoning, and 
employs particular representations, such as directed acyclic graphs (DAGs) and Bayesian causal nets [1-
4,6-10,30-35]. A key tenet is that the ability to discern (and quantify) “causal effects” hinges on positing 
counterfactuals that involve “manipulable” exposures which could in principle be randomized [1-
4,6,7,30-35]. Indeed, in some expositions, “causal inference” has effectively become shorthand for 
“counterfactual causal inference” [1-4,6-10,30-35], as if no other approach to causal inference exists. 
Many (but not necessarily all) proponents of this approach further accept the premise that if an exposure 
cannot be “manipulated” (and, in effect, be randomized in principle, if not in actuality), it cannot produce 
“causal effects” [34-36].  
 These are strong claims. Not surprisingly, they are also contested: within and outside the field of 
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epidemiology [9,10,14,19,37-47]. Escalating debates about “causes,” “causation,” “evidence,” and 
“explanations” are taking place in a wide variety of empirical population, policy, biological, and other 
natural sciences, and also disciplines that analyze science, e.g., philosophy, the history of science, and 
science and technology studies more broadly [37-50]. Within just the past 6 years, several large 
interdisciplinary tomes, each close to or exceeding 800 pages, have appeared, sporting such titles as: “The 
Oxford Handbook of Causation” (790 pages; 2009) [39], “Causality in the Sciences” (952 pages; 2011) 
[40], and “Arguing About Science” (795 pages; 2012) [38]. 
 For epidemiology, a population science that necessarily straddles, simultaneously, the 
stochasticity (randomness) involved in the causes of individual cases and the population-level structuring 
of risk that produces predictable group-level differences [16,28,51,52], we argue that two issues are 
paramount. The first concerns who and what the current counterfactual framework of “causal inferences” 
is precluding from being deemed a “cause,” thereby narrowing the scope of the field. The second focuses 
on how the newly favored methods, despite their undoubted strengths, can also potentially lead to 
spurious causal inference, especially if key biological and social assumptions about parameters are poorly 
conceived, thereby potentially causing harm. 
 In our view, no one causal approach should drive the questions asked or delimit what counts as 
useful evidence. Robust causal inference instead comprises a complex narrative, created by scientists 
appraising, from diverse perspectives, different strands of evidence produced by myriad methods [10,12-
17,27,28,33,37-50]. DAGs can of course be useful [1-8,30-35], but should not alone wag the causal tale.   
 We argue instead that epidemiology, like any science, needs a flexible, multi-faceted, and 
historically-informed approach to causal inference. Only such an approach can grapple with the major 
complex public health issues of our times, among which are social inequalities in health within and 
between nations, the overlapping burdens of communicable and non-communicable diseases (including 
emerging infections), and the planetary emergency of environmental change, as driven by climate change 
[15-17,53-59]. To make our case, we first address key conceptual issues, after which we offer several 
concrete examples. 
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Clarifying causation: a case for pluralism about causes and types of evidence –and for explanation 
 Before jumping into the epidemiologic evidence, some clarifications are in order. First, we 
recognize that debates about what constitutes “causation” and demonstrating its existence have a long 
history – of at least a few millennia! [43] – and we obviously will not resolve these controversies in one 
essay. Second, our vantage is as pluralists: both about causality and about evidence [44,45], and we 
explain below what this entails. Third, our motivation to enter this debate is because we want to 
strengthen epidemiologic science and its capacity to contribute usefully to the multisectoral work urgently 
needed to improve population health and reduce, if not eliminate, health inequities [16,17].  
 In brief, within philosophical discourse the lack of a single theory or definition of “cause” is 
widely recognized, as is the notion that there is not just one method to identify causal processes and 
effects [37-46]. Two recent reviews, for example, have helpfully clarified [44,45] that not only are there 
“five families of `standard view’ on causality” – i.e., “regularity, counterfactual, probabilistic, 
process/mechanist and agency/interventionist” [45, p. 769], but also that, for research conducted as 
guided by any of these “views,” there also exists “evidential pluralism,” referring to how “evidence of a 
variety of kinds – say, probabilistic, mechanistic, regularity – can bear on a causal hypothesis and 
strengthen it” [44, p. 27]. The implication is that “triangulation” of evidence “from a number of 
independent methods is one and perhaps the only way to be reasonably confident about the truth of the 
hypothesis” [44, p. 27].  
 Among the many reasons triangulation of evidence based on data from different contexts is 
important is recognition that the longer the causal “chain” or the larger the causal “network,” the more 
likely that context-dependent effects are large enough to matter, implying the observed “effects” may be 
historically contingent [37-47]. Suggesting these are practical, not esoteric, concerns, UNAIDS in 2010 
released a guide titled An Introduction to Triangulation [60], as part of their “monitoring and evaluation 
fundamentals” series. Intended to improve the monitoring and societal response to the HIV epidemic and 
other health outcomes, the booklet reviews the strengths and limitations of four widely-used types of 
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triangulation: “(1) data triangulation; (2) investigator triangulation; (3) theory triangulation; and (4) 
methodological or method triangulation” [60, p. 14] and further provides diverse empirical examples of 
why all four types of triangulation are necessary, since no one approach can guarantee robust causal 
inference. In our section on empirical examples, we provide concrete illustrations as to what such 
“triangulation” can entail for epidemiologic research.  
 Causal questions and answers, and hence inferences, may further depend on spatiotemporal scale 
and level [14,17,37-45]. Consider, after all, the classic question posed by the neurobiologist Steven Rose: 
what caused the frog to jump? [61, pp. 10-13; 62]. At the fast-and-tiny molecular level, an answer might 
be: the reaction of actin and myosin within a muscle cell. At the much slower and bigger level of 
organisms, an answer might be: the frog saw a snake and jumped in order to avoid being eaten. At the 
long-term and still larger level of species, still another answer might be: evolutionary processes leading to 
co-evolution of frogs and snakes as prey and predators in ecosystems affording niches for them both. 
Analytically distinct, all three answers are not only valid: they are concurrent, not sequential, inextricably 
embodied and joined in the instant that the frog jumps [62].  
 The same causal parsing applies to epidemiologic outcomes, as per the example of adiposity and 
cardiovascular mortality [63,64]. Thus, in a single instance, a death due to cardiovascular disease and 
cardiovascular mortality rates may be caused by individuals’ adverse physiological and metabolic profiles 
(e.g., high blood pressure, high lipids) and by the sociopolitical and economic conditions that drive both 
the political economy of “Big Food” and population distributions of risk of weight gain and inadequate 
medical care [54,56,65,66]. Such a view expands options for different levels and types of preventive 
interventions. For persons already with high adiposity, population research at the molecular and 
physiological levels suggests that causal links between adiposity and risk of death due to ischemic heart 
disease can be alleviated, if not completely broken, by intervening, pharmacologically, physiologically, or 
through individuals’ behavior changes, on such biological parameters as lipid profiles and blood pressure 
[67,68]. Additional research at the societal level points to the necessity of structural interventions to 
promote healthy ways of living, premised on conceptualization of food security and sustainability as a 
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human right, as opposed to treatment of food as primarily a for-profit commodity, so that all people can 
have access to affordable, nutritious, and pleasurable meals [54,65,66]. The point is both/and, not 
either/or. 
 Moreover, demonstrating that epidemiologists’ concerns about narrow renderings of “causation” 
that omit societal causes is not new, Textbox 1 presents an analogous “fable,” published shortly after the 
end of World War I by the epidemiologist F.G. Crookshank (1873-1933), in an essay titled “First 
principles: and epidemiology,” in which a single-minded police surgeon avers that if the cause of death by 
murder is a bullet, then the cause of death by war is many bullets (and sometimes also poisonous gas) 
[69]. To Crookshank, it was ludicrous to posit that germs alone were the single “true cause” (“causa 
vera”) of epidemics, and the only legitimate target of both inference and intervention; instead, for both 
war and epidemics, there could be no avoiding of discussion of “racial, economic, or political conditions,” 
not simply as “predisposing factors” but as causes in their own right [69, pp. 178-179]. Social and 
political challenges to vaccine distribution, e.g. for polio, measles, and human papilloma virus (HPV), 
serve to underscore this point [70-73]. 
 Of course, as with counterfactuals, the danger lies in where one draws the line, to avoid infinite 
regress as to the number of factors that need be considered. Continuing the military metaphor, Figure 2 
shows an alarming example of the ultimate arrow salad – or spaghetti: a PowerPoint slide prepared in 
2009 about US military strategy in Afghanistan [74,75]. Even Crookshank might have been daunted. 
Causal judgments: inference to the best explanation 
 Fortunately, recent work on “inference to the best explanation” (IBE), especially as articulated by 
the philosopher Peter Lipton (1954-2007) [42,76,77], can provide epidemiologists – and other scientists – 
with an alternative cogent, historically-grounded, conceptual approach to thinking about, sorting through, 
and arriving at robust explanations [5,42,45,48,49,78-80]. Curiously, although epidemiological research 
has been integral to Lipton’s arguments – as per his analysis of Ignaz Semmelweis’s 1844-1848 research 
on childbed fever [42, pp. 74-90] (see Textbox 2), discussion of IBE in the epidemiologic literature is 
surprisingly limited [5,48,49,80] – and nowhere to be found in many leading epidemiologic publications 
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on causal inference [1-4,6,7,30,32,35]. 
 What, then, is IBE? As explained by Lipton and other philosophers of science, IBE is a type of 
reasoning widely used by scientists (and most people in everyday life) [42,76-79]. It is also increasingly 
viewed by philosophers and historians of science as being, in the words of Douven, the “cornerstone of 
scientific methodology” and also “medical diagnosis” [78], with the latter notably and necessarily 
requiring cross-level inferences bridging from knowledge about unique individual patients to group-level 
regularities [81]. IBE’s primary concern is explanation, an expansive task that requires critically 
reasoning about extant (and missing) evidence and competing hypotheses that could explain the evidence. 
Reliant on one type of inductive reasoning, variously termed “abduction” or “defeasible” reasoning (see 
Table 1 for definitions) [42,78,79,82], IBE does not and cannot afford the same pristine certainty 
provided by deductive reasoning, whereby the conclusion logically must be true if the premises are true 
(e.g., Sam is a person, all people are mortal, therefore Sam is mortal). Though this might seem a 
drawback, contemporary scholarship increasingly demonstrates that IBE far better reflects the actual 
practice of science, advances in scientific explanation, and the successful implementation of what has 
been learned,  in such diverse fields as the physical, biological, epidemiological, clinical, or social 
sciences, as compared to the idealized hypothetico-deductive approach [37-42,76-79,82], which over the 
past 30 years has been variously lauded [83-86], rejected [87,88], and accepted in modified form [89,90] 
in the epidemiological literature. 
 In brief, the essence of the IBE approach is to “think through inferential problems in causal rather 
than logical terms” [42, p. 208] and to employ a “two-stage mechanism involving the generation of 
candidate hypotheses and then selection from among them” [42, p. 208]. IBE is thus driven by theory, 
substantive knowledge, and evidence, as opposed to being driven solely by logic or by probabilities. 
Absolute Cartesian skepticism is rendered moot, since the emphasis is on best explanation, as opposed to 
the conjuring of any explanation, however improbable (or useless) [78]. Nor is IBE hobbled by a common 
problem that deductive reasoning cannot resolve: how to evaluate competing hypotheses when none are 
logically refuted by the extant evidence [76, pp. 452-453]; for examples, see Textbox 2 regarding 
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Lipton’s analysis of how Semmelweiss adjudicated between such competing hypotheses regarding 
cause(s) of childbed fever.  
 Guiding choice among explanations for IBE is a contrastive approach geared to identifying what 
Lipton has termed the “loveliest” as opposed to merely “likeliest” hypothesis, whereby criterion for 
“loveliest” include: “scope, precision, mechanism, unification and simplicity” [76, p. 423]; “prediction” 
does not garner special consideration because opposing hypotheses may still both predict a given 
phenomenon (e.g., disease rates higher in groups exposed vs. not exposed to X), but not be equally 
“lovely.” Moreover, by emphasizing the need to test aptly chosen contrastive hypotheses, the IBE 
approach (per the examples provided in Textbox 2 for childbed fever) provides guidance for explanatory 
causal reasoning that goes beyond listing whether the evidence is, minimally, coherent (as per the Hill 
criteria) [42,76,77].  
 IBE is additionally highly attuned to contextual knowledge, and hence to the claims involved 
when assertions are made about “all else being equal” – whether via experimental design or statistical 
“control” [46,47,78,79]. It thus underscores the inevitable reliance, for good or for bad, upon scientific 
judgment. From the standpoint of IBE, “causal inference” cannot be reduced to what the philosopher 
Stathis Psillos has termed “topic-neutral and context-insensitive” algorithms [79, p. 441], whether 
involving deductive logic or Bayesian statistics. Core to IBE is the understanding that there are no clear-
cut rules or short cuts that minimize the need to amass substantive expertise and to generate and think 
critically about contrastive hypotheses – but nor is it the case that “anything goes.” 
 Stated another way, IBE clarifies that data never speak by themselves – either to computer 
algorithms or to people – nor do beliefs about probabilities simply drop from the sky. Active scientific 
judgment is inevitably involved, with regard to who and what is included and excluded. Scientists 
accordingly are enjoined to think about the full range of evidence, not just data germane to one specific 
hypothesis, and also to test hypotheses with diverse sets of methods whose assumptions are uncorrelated, 
so as to strengthen causal inference [5,42,45], a point we discuss further in relation to the empirical 
examples we next analyze. Although epidemiologists have long been aware of the need to compare data 
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across the proverbial “time, place, and person” [5,12-14,91] (or, rather, social group [17]), the emphasis 
on comparison across methods and causal inference frameworks is more recent [5,42,45]. 
 IBE further points to the necessity of eschewing the hubris of assuming that scientists can 
exhaustively delineate the profound complexity and quirkiness of the biophysical and social worlds in 
which we live, a world in which unanticipated discoveries of unimagined phenomena and causal 
connections are as much the rule as they are the exception [16,17,37-42,47,76,77]. One would need 
infinite knowledge, after all, to generate an exhaustive list of all conditions or factors that would ensure 
such assumptions as “other things being equal” or “other things being absent.” Who would have thought, 
for example, prior to work conducted in the past decade, that olfactory receptors, in both humans and 
other species, occur in just about every organ, including our skin, and are not just restricted to the nasal 
passage? [92,93] While the issue is far from closed, an explanatory reframing of these receptors as 
specialized evolved chemical detectors, not solely for smell, notably opens up a previously untheorized 
biological possibility, one with potential epidemiological as well as clinical relevance. An analogous case, 
relevant to cancer and cardiovascular disease, has been the explanatory reframing of estrogen from being 
a molecule primarily or solely preoccupied with “sex” and reproductive tissues to being a steroid involved 
in cell growth and apoptosis throughout the body [94,95], with the expression of estrogen receptors being 
both tissue-wide and highly responsive to exogenous stimuli [96-98]. Different conceptualizations of key 
parameters and different explanations entail different scientific programs and different interventions, one 
of the many reasons that debates over causal inference are so charged. 
 
Seeking explanations: epidemiological examples 
 We now redirect our focus to three concrete epidemiologic examples. Our purpose is to show 
why we cannot restrict the work of causal inference to solely a counterfactual approach, and why we may 
well do better to rise to the challenge of attempting to infer the best explanation. 
What a DAG cannot discern: the case of pellagra  
 We start with a seemingly simple yet informative example: explaining why rates of pellagra were 
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high among children in the US south who were institutionalized in orphanages in the early 20th c CE, as 
compared to other children in the region who were not institutionalized [99-104]. During this period, 
major debates, within and across causal levels, raged over whether pellagra – a disease whose prevalence 
was known to be both high and seasonal among people whose diet was primarily based on corn – was 
caused by an infectious agent, a fungus, stress, heredity, or even capitalism itself [99-105]. 
 Why the association between institutionalization and the disease? The two leading hypotheses 
involved the same causal elements, but the arrows pointed in entirely opposite directions. The “germ 
theory” hypothesis held that children who came to orphanages had a higher rate of infection, which they 
then more readily transmitted to other children within the crowded orphanages (but then: why did the staff 
not also get ill?). The contaminated food hypothesis held that the institutions caused the higher rates of 
pellagra because they served tainted food, i.e., contaminated corn mush (but then why did staff, who 
sometimes also ate the corn mush, not get ill?) [101]. The “stress” and “capitalism” hypotheses [99,100], 
while perhaps accurately identifying causes and aspects of the plight of institutionalized children, 
nevertheless did not explain why institutionalized impoverished children everywhere did not get pellagra. 
Both hypotheses could be represented by a DAG including the same elements, but with causal arrows in 
the reverse direction. 
 To resolve these conundrums, Joseph Goldberger devised an entirely new hypothesis: institutions 
caused the higher rates of pellagra because they served deficient food, whereby the orphanages fed 
children a poverty diet of corn mush supplemented by little else (whereas the staff ate not only the corn 
mush but also other more nutritious food, thereby preventing pellagra) [99-104] – and he conducted 
experiments with people (including himself, relatives, colleagues, and prisoners) and animals to test his 
hypothesis [99-104,106,107]. Later research revealed the missing factor was niacin, i.e., Vitamin B3 
[104]. 
 Of note, Goldberger’s hypothesis used the same three key variables (“orphans,” “institutions,” 
“pellagra”) employed in the two dominant rival hypotheses (“germ” and “contamination”) – but utterly 
transformed understanding of the causal relationships at play by introducing to the equation what was 
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then a new way of thinking about etiology: disease arising from deficiency, not excess. His alternative 
hypothesizing thus would yield a DAG with the same anchoring elements but totally different causal 
pathways, reflecting a new understanding of mechanisms of disease causation. Goldberger’s hypothesis, 
initially ill-received and unlikely, thus had to battle for recognition – and among the three, it was also, in 
Lipton’s terminology, the “loveliest.”  
 Why? Because, as Goldberger and his colleague Edgar Sydenstricker [12] emphasized at the time 
[108-110], it explained not only: (a) who did and did not contract pellagra at the orphanages, (b) the 
seasonal nature of the disease (as tied to when money for varied foods ran out, after the harvest season, 
among impoverished sharecroppers in the US south, leading to a diet of primarily corn mush leavened by 
some pork fat and perhaps a few greens) but also (c) why the disease was so common in the US South 
among impoverished (and/or institutionalized) persons, but was not so common among impoverished 
(and/or institutionalized) persons in the US North (because the former relied far more heavily than the 
latter on corn-mush diets) [99,106,108-110].  
 Granted, Goldberger’s hypothesis was not popular among US southern politicians or public 
health officials [99-104]. Why? Because it placed blame on not only the orphanages but also the structural 
institutions that protected sharecropping and high rates of southern poverty [99,100,110]. To Goldberger 
and Sydenstricker, however, understanding the interplay of causes across and within levels was essential 
for effective action in public health [12,99,100,110] – a truncated account would not suffice.  
 One final useful point raised by the example of pellagra concerns why technical manipulability 
should not be confused with causal powers. Thus, whether or not people had the technology to isolate and 
manipulate levels of Vitamin B3, its absence and presence still produced causal effects. Nevertheless, 
using a mixture of observational and experimental epidemiological evidence, along with a hefty dose of 
theorizing informed by deep knowledge of infectious disease epidemiology, Goldberger was able to arrive 
at a pragmatic causal explanation that, using Susser’s causal lexicography, got it “right enough” [14] to 
enable important effective preventive interventions to be implemented [99-104,106-110].  
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When is a methodological solution not the answer: using biology – and “triangulation” – to parse the 
puzzle of smoking, infant mortality, and the “birthweight paradox”  
 Next, we consider an example where it may be that the reasoning encoded in DAGs may have 
initially appeared to solve a paradox, only for further work to clarify that the proposed solution potentially 
may not be a satisfactory – or indeed “lovely” – deep explanation. The case is that of the well-known 
“birthweight paradox,” which first garnered attention in the early 1960s, as part of the disputes (fueled by 
tobacco company funding [22,23]) over whether smoking harms health [111,112]. In brief, the apparent 
paradox was then (and remains now) that although the on-average birthweight is lower for liveborn 
infants exposed vs. not exposed to tobacco smoke as fetuses, nevertheless the infant mortality rate among 
low birthweight infants is higher among infants unexposed vs. exposed to tobacco smoke when in utero 
[111-114]. The counterintuitive implication is that maternal smoking is protective for infant mortality for 
liveborn low birthweight infants. 
 Over the past 40 years, many rounds of arguments have appeared in the pages of many journals, 
offering diverse appraisals as to whether the “paradox” is “real,” as opposed to an artifact created by 
selection bias, choice of wrong referent or “at risk’ groups (e.g. fetus vs. liveborn infant), etc. [111-118]. 
As interest in using DAGs in epidemiology began to rise in the early 21st c CE, this “paradox” not 
surprisingly presented itself as a ripe candidate for analysis. The first round of papers using DAGs to 
address this paradox generally concluded that “collider bias,” i.e., introduction of confounding by an 
unmeasured factor due to conditioning on intermediate factor (in this case, smoking), is the cause of the 
apparent “paradox” [114,116,117]. The take-home message of these papers is that the paradox is 
resolved: the problem has been dealt with by appropriate methods. In other words, the explanation is to 
explain away the observed association as a consequence of bias induced by faulty methods. 
 But is this apparent end of the story? Suggesting there may be yet more wags to this particular 
tale, an elaborated and biologically plausible alternative explanation exists, one that may well do a better 
job at being “lovelier,” by virtue of elucidating mechanisms and opening up possibilities for unifying 
understanding of other seemingly unrelated “paradoxes.”  It is that infants who are low birthweight for 
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reasons other than smoking may well have experienced harms during their fetal development unrelated to 
and much worse than those imposed by smoking, e.g., stochastic semi-disasters that knock down 
birthweight, as a result of random genetic or epigenetic anomalies affecting the sperm or egg prior to 
conception or arising during fertilization and embryogenesis [16,114,118].  
 Of note, the proposed alternative biological explanation cannot be discerned from a DAG. Indeed, 
as pointed out in a new reflection on using DAGs to parse this paradox, the DAGs for collider bias and 
for heterogeneity of low birthweight phenotypes have an identical structure [117]. A larger and “lovelier” 
point is that profoundly different causal pathways can result in two distinct groups nevertheless exhibiting 
the same state – and a DAG, by itself, cannot resolve which hypothesized pathways, if any, are correct. 
 An IBE approach further recognizes that no one study design can provide a definitive robust test 
of the hypotheses at issue. Instead, as noted above, what is required is evidential pluralism, i.e., 
triangulation of evidence from empirical studies whose methodological assumptions, limitations, biases, 
and errors (which inevitably affect all studies) are uncorrelated [5,42-45,48,49,60,76,77,119]. In Textbox 
3 we provide examples of what such systematic triangulation of evidence, derived using approaches with 
different biases, entails for the example of smoking and birthweight [119-125].   
 A similarly structured paradox, also involving children’s health, generated even more heated 
discussion 70 years before the birthweight paradox – and likewise demonstrates the important value of the 
type of reasoning encoded in DAGs and also the work needed to determine if the underlying encoded 
assumptions are biologically and socially sound. In 1910, Karl Pearson and colleagues reported data 
apparently showing no detrimental effects of parental alcoholism on the health and development of their 
offspring [126,127], results which not surprisingly generated fierce controversy [128]. The economist 
A.C. Pigou, in an elegant riposte, pointed out how selection of the sample could generate such a null 
association even when an adverse influence existed in the overall population [129], thereby describing 
what would today be termed “collider bias” [130].  
 Pigou’s description of how this seeming paradox could arise was specific to the particular 
conditions of Pearson’s investigations [129]. Attesting to the value of DAGs for identifying the 
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“transportability” of the identified type of bias, i.e., the conditions under which it can affect other 
investigations [33], other similarly structured explanations for particular issues have been produced in the 
epidemiologic literature many times since, from Berkson’s presentation of what became his eponymous 
bias [131] through Greenland and Neutra’s discussion of a potentially misleading study design proposed 
to investigate the influence of endogenous estrogens on endometrial cancer [132]. As these examples 
suggest, formal formulation of such potential biases – which can be represented in DAGs – clearly 
provides an incisive way of extending thinking about bias from one situation to another, one that can aid 
the overall evaluation of evidence in any given particular situation.  
 It is another matter entirely, however, to elucidate, empirically, if the hypothesized biases do 
indeed exist and if they are sufficient to generate the observed associations. At issue is not simply whether 
a potential bias exists, but whether the plausible magnitude of its quantitative effect is sufficient to bias 
the study results [133,134]. 
 Nor can a DAG provide insight into what omitted variables might be important or whether a 
variable is even conceptualized appropriately (as per the pellagra example); only use of relevant scientific 
theories (including epidemiologic theories of disease distribution) can aid conceptualizing the phenomena 
that co-produce the hypothesized causal relationships [13-17,20,21,37-43]. A corollary is that despite the 
clear value of DAGs for formalizing certain types of biases, this feature does not mean this approach has 
more inferential value compared to components of evidence that cannot be disciplined in this way, e.g., 
the structuring effects of macroeconomic and social forces. An appeal for “evidence-based” policies that 
relies, say, solely on randomized clinical trials or other interventions carried out on individuals will 
inevitably lead to debased policy making, as we have argued elsewhere [135,136]. Causes do not cease 
being causes if they are challenging to study.  
 
Racism and health: the harm caused by spurious “causal inference” and “counterfactuals” 
 Our final example accordingly concerns a structural determinant, using the long-argued case of 
racism and health [137-141]. One alarming feature of late 20th and current 21st c CE epidemiologic 
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literature on “causal inference” is the re-appearance of previously rebutted causal claims that “race” is an 
individual “attribute” and that it cannot be a “cause” because is not “modifiable” [1,34,36,142-145]. Five 
such examples are provided in Textbox 4, culled from diverse public health, epidemiologic, biostatistics, 
and sociological publications [1,34,142-144]. They are congruent with new lines of contested work, 
supported by considerable NIH funding, that seek to “re-molecularize” race [146-153]. 
 However, we clarified back in 2000 [50] and reiterated since [154], in accord with a considerable 
literature extending back to the 19th c CE [17,137-141,147,152-162], the problem – one with enormously 
harmful public health and policy implications -- is that this approach to causal inference and 
counterfactuals starts at the wrong level, and uses DAGs to bark at the wrong tree, and indeed miss the 
forest entirely. 
 What is the problem with viewing “race” as an “inherent feature of individuals” [1, p. 70] or as an 
“immutable characteristic” [144, p. 775]? The problems are two-fold: bad biology and bad social science, 
compounded by an ahistorical approach to both the literature and the evidence. First, with regard to bad 
biology, this belief fails to acknowledge reams of genetic evidence demonstrating H. sapiens cannot 
meaningfully be parsed (including by so-called “cluster” programs) into discrete genetically distinct 
“races” who can be singularly identified by a set of traits and for whom variation within groups is less 
than variation between groups [146-153]. By now, the notion of discrete, let alone “fixed,” “races,” 
especially in countries such as the US, with its history of being a colonial-settler and immigrant nation 
that also imported slaves and upheld legal slavery for centuries (1619-1865) , is especially absurd 
[17,28,54,146-153].  
 Second, with regard to bad social science, the view of “race” as, in effect, a “natural” kind 
(existing a priori, as a “real” grouping that exists independent of human classificatory schemes), 
completely disregards nearly two centuries’ worth of scholarship on the histories of the social creation – 
and enforcement, by law, by force, and by terror – of the varied “racial” categories deployed in diverse 
societies, let alone their changing permutations over time [17,28,54,137-141,146-156,162-168]. It also 
ignores how these “racial” categories, like any social relationship, are co-constitutive: each is defined and 
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bounded in relation to the other, just as are master and slave, and masculine and feminine [28,137, 
169,170]. Change the social relationship, and the categories and how people relate to them and what they 
mean for their lives and their health will consequently change as well. This type of dynamic co-causation, 
replete with feedback loops, however, is not what is conventionally (or easily) depicted in DAGs. 
 Even so, epidemiologic evidence provides supportive evidence for the hypothesis that 
modification of race relations causes changes in the population distributions of health. The relevant 
counterfactual pertains to racism, not “race.” Examples include studies showing the beneficial impact of 
the abolition of Jim Crow in the mid-1960s on black/white inequities in infant mortality rates, above and 
beyond improvements linked to such Great Society programs as the “War on Poverty” and the 
introduction of Medicare, Medicaid, and desegregated health care facilities [172-176]. Causing these 
“modifications” was the power of social movements, which challenged structural racism, forced repeal of 
unjust laws, and created space and resources for health and social scientists and health and social work 
practitioners to provide input into newly possible programs [177-180]. Treat “race” as a given and focus 
only on discrete “factors,” such as “income,” as some proponents of the DAG approach propose 
[34,142,145], and a DAG will tell a biased tale that is woefully incomplete for guiding policy and 
promoting health equity. Although such realities do not sit easily with admonitions for epidemiologists to 
focus only on “causes” that can be “modified” by health or policy professionals [181-183], they are the 
facts we confront when dealing with health inequities.  
 The larger implication is that the “loveliest” explanation of racial/ethnic inequities in health is the 
one that engages most deeply with the ugly social facts of past and present realities of racial inequality 
and its myriad social, economic, and embodied manifestations [17,62,137-141]. Far more comprehensive 
explanations of the epidemiologic evidence can be achieved if, rather than treat “race” as an unmodifiable 
“inherent feature” and posit either an endless and illusory set of “racial” genetic differences in gene 
frequency for each and every ailment or a set of material conditions that are held to be “modifiable” 
without addressing inequitable race relations, we instead tackle the causal relationships between racism 
and health head on. To do so, we can be aided by the central insights of the ecosocial theory of disease 
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distribution and focus attention on how people literally embody, biologically, their societal and ecological 
context, thereby producing population patterns of health, disease, and well-being [17,62,184,185]. 
 
Conclusion 
 We deliberately have not offered one prescription for how epidemiologists can best infer 
causation. No such prescription exists. Nor, of course, do we suggest that some approaches (e.g., use of 
DAGs where appropriate) be ruled out of court and banished to the dog-house. Instead, as we hope the 
examples we have provided demonstrate, there is no short cut for hard thinking about the biological and 
social realities and processes that jointly create the phenomena we epidemiologists seek to explain, 
always with an eye towards producing knowledge that we and others can use to improve population 
health, reduce preventable suffering, and, we add, advance health equity.  
 To accomplish these goals, we advocate that the field of epidemiology consider judicious use of 
the broad and flexible framework of “inference to the best explanation.” This stance requires not only that 
we be open to being pluralists about both causation and evidence but that we also rise to the challenge of 
forging explanations that aspire to “scope, precision, mechanism, unification and simplicity” [42, p. 423]. 
 No single study, however beautifully designed, can unequivocally demonstrate causation. To 
improve our causal explanations, we would do best instead to opt for causal triangulation [5;42, pp. 53-
54; 44, p. 27;48,49,60,186,187]. In practical terms, as illustrated by Textbox 3, this means systematically 
employing and assessing evidence in relation to diverse study designs, involving different methodological 
assumptions and biases [5,48,49,60,186,187], and also testing our hypotheses in different populations and 
in different historical periods [5,60,186-190], to see if results are robust to the confounding structures 
encountered and the analytic methods used. In essence, the biases for each method employed – since, of 
course, all methods have potential biases – would be through different processes, and unrelated, to the 
biases in the other methods. DAGs and counterfactual approaches are but one set of conceptual tools that 
epidemiologists can employ, and should not occupy a privileged place in delimiting the kinds of questions 
we ask or causes we theorize.  
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 We would hazard the guess that many who advocate these styles of thought would probably agree 
with our position, but might not see the current emphasis on applying formal rules as leading to questions 
becoming restricted to those which fit neatly within these rules. Suggesting, however, that we are not 
raising straw arguments are narrow framings of what constitutes legitimate causal inference 
accompanying the burgeoning use of these methods and advocacy to do so [1,6-8,11,30-32,34,35,142-
145]. Our fear is that these new “cutting-edge” methods will, by virtue of their rule-bound nature, limit 
the scope of epidemiology and its impact on the urgent real-world problems of global population health 
[9,10,17,33,53-56]. 
 We close by noting that in 1957, Jerry Morris included in “Uses of Epidemiology” a section he 
titled “Changing People in a Changing Society,” in which he raised a series of question that have 
fruitfully shaped the field’s research program for now well over a half century [13, pp. 19-23]. Among his 
many questions were [13, p. 22]:  
“What are the implications to Public Health of more married women going out to work? And less of 
the older men? Of still increasing urban – and suburbanization? The rapid growth of new towns? 
Smokeless zones (still with sulphur)? The building of new power stations? Of less physical activity in 
work and more bodily sloth generally? … Of the more than 1000 extra motor vehicles a day? Of the 
rising consumption of sugar … Of the cheapening of fats? … Such questions (of contemporary 
history, it might be said) could readily be multiplied.”  
 
Noting that “[s]ome of the issues mentioned above cannot yet be framed in scientific terms; but parts at 
least of others could be tackled more energetically,” Morris nonetheless optimistically averred: “Perhaps 
epidemiology with its special skills in identifying what matters more and what matters less, its concern 
for woods rather than trees, perhaps the epidemiological method can simplify such issues and usefully 
raise some bold questions about these too” [13, p. 23]. 
 Any approach to causal inference that cannot help us answer the kinds of prevention-oriented 
questions that Morris posed, that cannot brook analysis of inequitable social relations as a cause of 
population health and health inequities [50-56,137-141], and that cannot conceive how to address the 
causal epidemiologic implications of the planetary crisis of global climate change [57-59,191,192], is 
inadequate – and if it restricts what questions can be asked, it is wrong. We can – and must – do better. 
        21 
 
REFERENCES 
1. Glass TA, Goodman SN, Hernán MA, Samet JM. Causal inference in public health. Annu Rev 
Public Health 2013; 34:61-75. 
2. Greenland S, Pearl J, Robins JM. Causal diagrams for epidemiological research. Epidemiol 1999; 
10:37-48. 
3. Robins JM, Hernán MA, Brumbach B. Marginal structural models and causal inference in 
epidemiology. Epidemiol 2000; 11:550-560. 
4. VanderWeele TJ, Vansteelandt S, Robins JM. Marginal structural models for sufficient cause 
interactions. Am J Epidemiol 2010; 1717:506-514. 
5. Richmond RC, Al-Amin A, Davey Smith G, Relton C. Approaches for drawing causal inferences 
from epidemiological birth cohorts: a review. Early Human Devel 2014; 90:769-780. 
6. VanderWeele T. Explanation in causal inference: methods for mediation and interaction. New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2015. 
7. Hernán MA, Robins JM.  Causal Inference. Boca Raton: Chapman & Hall/CRC, forthcoming 
(2016). Available at: http://www.hsph.harvard.edu/miguel-hernan/causal-inference-book/ ; 
accessed: March 23, 2016. 
8. Porta M, Vineis P, Bolúmar F. The current deconstruction of paradoxes: one sign of the ongoing 
methodological “revolution.” Eur J Epidemiol 2015; 1-9. [Epub ahead of print] 
9. Broadbent A. Causation and prediction in epidemiology: a guide to the “methodological 
revolution.” Studies Hist Philosophy Biol Biomedical Sci 2015; 54:72-80. 
10. Vandenbroucke JP, Broadbent A, Pearce N. Causality and causal inference in epidemiology: the 
need for a pluralistic approach. Int J Epidemiol 2016: dyv341. 
11. Web of Science. Available at: http://apps.webofknowledge.com.ezp-
prod1.hul.harvard.edu/WOS_GeneralSearch_input.do?product=WOS&search_mode=GeneralSea
rch&SID=1CMnQV8qjBQMk8nIloV&preferencesSaved= ; accessed: January 28, 2016. 
12. Sydenstricker E. Health & Environment. New York: McGraw Hill, 1933. 
13. Morris JN. Uses of Epidemiology. Edinburgh: E. & S. Livingstone, Ltd, 1957. 
14. Susser M. Causal Thinking in Health Sciences: Concepts and Strategies of Epidemiology. New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1973. 
15. Davey Smith G, Ebrahim S. Epidemiology – is it time to call it a day? Int J Epidemiol 2001; 
30:1-11. 
16. Davey Smith G. Epidemiology, epigenetics and the `Gloomy Prospect’: embracing randomness in 
population health research and practice. Int J Epidemiol 2011; 40:537-562. 
17. Krieger N. Epidemiology & The People’s Health: Theory & Context. New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2011. 
18. Cornfield J, Haenszel W, Hammond EC, Lilienfeld AM, Shimkin MB, Wynder EL. Smoking and 
lung cancer: recent evidence and a discussion of some questions. JNCI 1959; 22:173–203 
(Reprinted Int J Epidemiol 2009; 38:1175-1191). 
19. Stallones, RA. The Association between Tobacco Smoking and Coronary Heart Disease. Draft 
report of June 28 [1963] to the Surgeon General's Advisory Committee on Smoking and Health.  
Int J Epidemiol 2015; 44:735-743. 
        22 
 
20. Blackburn H. Commentary: “The association between tobacco smoking and coronary heart 
disease.” An unpublished memorandum by Reuel Stallones, consultant in cardiovascular diseases 
to the U.S. Surgeon General’s Advisory Committee on Smoking and Health, 28 June and 19 July 
1963. Int J Epidemiol 2015; 44:744-748. 
21. Hill AB. The environment and disease: association or causation? Proc R Soc Med 1965; 58:295-
300. 
22. Brandt AM. The Cigarette Century: The Rise, Fall, and Deadly Persistence of the Product that 
Defined America. New York: Basic Books, 2007. 
23. Proctor R. Golden Holocaust: Origins of the Cigarette Catastrophe and the Case for Abolition. 
Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2011. 
24. Yeo EJ. Social surveys in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In: Porter RM, Ross D (eds). 
The Cambridge History of Science, Vol 7: The Modern Social Sciences. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003; 83-99. 
25. Porter TM. Trust in Numbers: The Pursuit of Objectivity in Science and Public Life. Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995. 
26. Hacking I. The Taming of Chance. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1990. 
27. Krieger N. Epidemiology and the social sciences: towards a critical engagement in the 21st 
century. Epidemiol Rev 2000; 22:155-163. 
28. Krieger N. Who and what is a `population’? Historical debates, current controversies, and 
implications for understanding `population health’ and rectifying health inequities. Milbank 
Quarterly 2012; 90:634-681. 
29. Hamlin C. Public Health and Social Justice in the Age of Chadwick: Britain, 1800-1854. 
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998. 
30. Glymour MM, Greenland S. Causal diagrams. In: Rothman K, Greenland S, Lash T (eds). 
Modern Epidemiology. 3rd ed. Philadelphia: Lippincott Williams & Wilkins, 2008; 183-209. 
31. Forita R, Spallek J, Zeeb H. Directed acyclic graphs. in: Ahrens W, Pigeot I (eds). Handbook of 
Epidemiology. 2nd ed. New York: Springer Science+Business Media, 2014; 1481-1517. 
32. Pearl J. Causality – Models, Reasoning, and Inference. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2009. 
33. Swanson SD. Communicating causality. Eur J Epidemiol 2015; 30:1073-1075. 
34. VanderWeele TJ, Hernán MA. Causal effects and natural laws: towards a conceptualization of 
causal counterfactuals for nonmanipulable exposures, with application to the effects of race and 
sex. In: Berzuini C, Dawid P, Bernardinelli L (eds). Causality: Statistical Perspectives and 
Applications. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., 2012; 101-113. 
35. Imbens GW, Rubin DB. Causal Inference for Statistics, Social and Biomedical Sciences: An 
Introduction. Cambridge: Oxford University Press, 2015. 
36. Holland PW. Statistics and causal inference. J Am Stat Assoc 1986; 81:945-960. 
37. Curd M, Psillos S (eds). The Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Science. 2nd ed. New 
Brunswick, NJ: Routledge, 2013. 
38. Bird A, Ladyman J (eds). Arguing about Science. New York: Routledge, 2012. 
39. Beebee H, Hitchcock C, Menzies P. The Oxford Handbook of Causation. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2009. 
        23 
 
40. Illari PM, Russo F, Williamson J (eds). Causality in the Sciences. New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2011. 
41. Ziman JM. Real Science: What it is, and What it Means. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press, 2000. 
42. Lipton P. Inference to the Best Explanation. 2nd ed. London: Routledge, 2004. 
43. Losee J. Theories of Causality: From Antiquity to the Present. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction 
Press, 2012. 
44. Reiss JR. Causation in the social sciences: evidence, inference, and purpose. Phil Soc Sci 2009 
39:20-40. 
45. Reiss J. Causation in the sciences: an inferentialist account. Studies Hist Phil Biol Biomed Sci 
2012; 43:769-777. 
46. Cartwright N. Hunting Causes and Using Them: Approaches in Philosophy and Economics. 
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2007. 
47. Cartwright N, Hardie J. Evidence-led Policy: A Practical Guide to Doing it Better. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2012. 
48. Davey Smith G, Hermani G. Mendelian randomization: genetic anchors for causal inference in 
epidemiological studies. Human Molecular Genetics 2014; 23(R1):R89-R98. 
49. Davey Smith G. The Wright stuff: genes in the interrogation of correlation and causation. Eur J 
Personality 2012; 26:395-397. 
50. Krieger N, Davey Smith G. Re: “Seeking causal explanations in social epidemiology.” (letter). 
Am J Epidemiol 2000; 151:831-832.  
51. Rockhill B. Theorizing about cases at the individual level while estimating effects at the 
population level: implications for prevention. Epidemiol 2005; 16:124-129. 
52. Marmot M. Social causes of social inequalities in health. In: Anand S, Peter F, Sen A (eds). 
Public Health, Ethics, and Equity. New York: Oxford University Press, 2004; 37-62. 
53. World Health Organization, Commission on the Social Determinants of Health. Closing the Gap 
in a Generation: Health Equity Through Action on the Social Determinants of Health. Geneva: 
World Health Organization, 2008. Available at: 
http://www.who.int/social_determinants/thecommission/finalreport/en/ ; accessed: March 23, 
2016. 
54. Birn AE, Pillay Y, Holtz TH. Textbook of International Health: Global Health in a Dynamic 
World. 3rd ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 2009. 
55. World Health Organization. World Health Statistics 2014. Geneva: World Health Organization, 
2014. Available at: http://www.who.int/gho/publications/world_health_statistics/2014/en/ ; 
accessed: March 23, 2016. 
56. Global Health Watch. Global Health Watch 4: An Alternative World Health Report. London: Zed 
Books, 2014. 
57. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). Fifth Assessment Report (AR5). Available 
at: http://ipcc.ch/report/ar5/index.shtml ; accessed: March 23, 2016. 
58. McMichael AJ. Population health in the Anthropocene: gains, losses, and emerging trends. 
Anthropocene Review 2014; 1:44-56. 
        24 
 
59. Patz JA, Frumkin H, Holloway T, Vimont DJ, Haines A. Climate change:  challenges and 
opportunities for global health. JAMA 2014; 312:1565-1580. 
60. UNAIDS. An Introduction to Triangulation. Geneva, Switzerland: UNAIDS, 2010. Available at: 
http://social3.org/a/an-introduction-to-triangulation---unaids-w25562 ; accessed: March 23, 2016. 
61. Rose S. Lifelines: Biology Beyond Determinism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998. 
62. Krieger N. Embodiment: a conceptual glossary for epidemiology. J Epidemiol Community Health 
2005; 59:350-355. 
63. Hu FB. Obesity Epidemiology. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008. 
64. Banack HR, Kaufman J. The obesity paradox: understanding the effect of obesity on mortality 
among individuals with cardiovascular disease. Prev Med 2014; 62:96-102. 
65. Nestle M. Food Politics: How the Food Industry Influences Nutrition and Health. Revised and 
expanded 10th anniversary edition. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2013. 
66. Booth S, Coveney J. Food Democracy: From Consumer to Food Citizen. Springer Briefs in 
Public Health. Singapore: Springer, 2015. 
67. Varbo A, Benn M, Davey Smith G, Timpson NJ, Tybjaerg-Hansen A, Nordestgaard BG. 
Remnant cholesterol, low-density lipoprotein cholesterol, and blood pressure as mediators from 
obesity to ischemic heart disease. Circulation Res Published online before print November 19, 
2014, doi: 10.1161/CIRCRESAHA.116.304846 
68. Würtz P, Wang Q, Kangas AJ, Richmond RC, Skarp J, Tiainen M, Tynkkynen T, Soininen P, 
Havulinna AS, Kaakinen M, Viikari JS, Savolainen MJ, Kähönen, M, Lehtimäki T, Männistö S, 
Blankenberg S, Zeller T, Laitinen J, Pouta A, Mäntyselkä P, Vanhala M, Elliott P, Pietiläinen 
KH, Ripatti S, Salomaa V, Raitakari OT, Järvelin M-R, Davey Smith G, Ala-Korpela M. 
Metabolic signatures of adiposity in young adults: mendelian randomization analysis and effects 
of weight change. PLoS Med 2014; 11(12): e1001765. doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1001765 
69. Crookshank FG. First principles: and epidemiology. Proc Roy Soc Med 1919-1920; Sect Epidem, 
13:159-184. 
70. Lakoff A. Vaccine politics and the management of reason. Public Culture 2015; 27:419-425. 
71. Ganapathiraju PV, Mossink CB, Plumb J. Endgame for polio eradication? Options for 
overcoming social and political factors in the progress to eradicating polio. Global Public Health 
2015; 10:463-473. 
72. Lillviv DF, Kirkland A, Frick A. Power and persuasion in the vaccine debates: an analysis of 
political efforts and outcomes in the United States. Milbank Q 2014; 92:475-508. 
73. Casper MJ, Carpenter LM. Sex, drugs, and politics: the HPV vaccine for cervical cancer. Sociol 
Health Illness 2008; 30:886-899. 
74. PA Consulting Group. Afghanistan Stability / COIN Dynamics. Working Draft – V3. Available 
at: http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/MSNBC/Components/Photo/2009/December/091202/091203-
engel-big-9a.jpg ; accessed: March 23, 2016. 
75. Bummller E. We have met the enemy and he is power point. New York Times, April 26, 2010. 
Available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/27/world/27powerpoint.html?_r=0  ; accessed: 
March 23, 2016. 
76. Lipton P. Précis of Inference to the Best Explanation, 2nd ed. Philosoph Phenom Res 2007; 
74:421-423. 
        25 
 
77. Lipton P. Causation and explanation. In: Beebee H, Hitchcock C, Menzies P. The Oxford 
Handbook of Causation. New York: Oxford University Press, 2009 ; 619-631. 
78. Douven I. Abduction. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2011 edition; Zalta EN, 
ed). Available at: http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2011/entries/abduction/ ; accessed: March 
23, 2016. 
79. Psillos S. The fine structure of inference to the best explanation. Philosoph Phenom Res 2007; 
74:441-448. 
80. Broadbent A. What could possibly go wrong? – a heuristic for predicting population health 
outcomes of interventions. Prev Med 2011; 53:256-259. 
81. Davey Smith G, Egger M. Incommunicable knowledge? Interpreting and applying the results of 
clinical trials and meta-analysis. J Clin Epidemiol 1998; 51:289-295. 
82. Koons R. Defeasible reasoning. In: Zalta EN (ed). The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
(Spring 2014 Edition). Available at: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/reasoning-defeasible/ ; 
accessed: March 23, 2016. 
83. Koch E, Otarala A, Kirschbaum A. A landmark for Popperian epidemiology: refutation of the 
randomized Aldactone evaluation study. J Epidemiol Community Health 2005; 59:1000-1006. 
84. Hyams KC. The investigation fatigue syndrome: a case study of the limitations of inductive 
inferences and non-falsifiable hypotheses in medical research. Medical Hypotheses 2003; 
60:760-766. 
85. Maclure M. Multivariate refutation of etiologic hypotheses in non-experimental epidemiology. 
Int J Epidemiol 1990; 19:782-787. 
86. Buck C. Popper’s philosophy for epidemiologists. Int J Epidemiol 1975; 4:159-168. 
87. Susser M. The logic of Sir Karl Popper and the practice of epidemiology. Am J Epidemiol 1986; 
124:711-718. 
88. Jacobsen M. Against Popperized epidemiology. Int J Epidemiol 1976; 5:9-11. 
89. Rothman KJ, Greenland S, Lash TL. Modern Epidemiology. 3rd edition. Philadelphia: Wolters 
Kluwer Health/Lippincott Williams & Wilkins, 2008; pp. 20-25, 30. 
90. Greenland S. Induction versus Popper: substance versus semantics. Int J Epidemiol 1998; 
4:543-548. 
91. MacMahon B, Sawa JM. Physical damage to the fetus. Milbank Quarterly 1961; 39:14-83. 
92. Denda M. Newly discovered olfactory receptors in epidermal keratinocytes are associated with 
proliferation, migration, and re-epithelialization of keratinocytes. J Invest Dermatol 2014; 
134:2677-2679. 
93. Busse D, Kudella P, Grüning N-M, Gisselmann G, Ständer S, Luger T, Jacobsen F, Steinsträßer 
L, Ralf R, Gkogkolou P, Böm M, Hatt H, Benecke H.A synthetic sandalwood odorant induces 
wound-healing processes in human keratinocytes via the olfactory receptor OR2AT4. J Invest 
Dermatol 2014; 134:2823-2832. 
94. Oudshoorn N. Beyond the Natural Body: An Archaeology of Sex Hormones. London: Routledge, 
1994. 
95. Krieger N, Löwy I, and the “Women, Hormones, and Cancer” group (Aronowitz R, Bigby J, 
Dickersin K, Garner E, Gaudillière J-P, Hinestrosa C, Hubbard R, Johnson PA, Missmer SA, 
Norsigian J, Pearson C, Rosenberg CE, Rosenberg L, Rosenkrantz BG, Seaman B, Sonnenschein 
        26 
 
C, Soto AM, Thorton J, Weisz G). Hormone replacement therapy, cancer, controversies & 
women’s health: historical, epidemiological, biological, clinical and advocacy perspectives. J 
Epidemiol Community Health 2005; 59:740-748. 
96. Krieger N. History, biology, and health inequities: emergent embodied phenotypes & the 
illustrative case of the breast cancer estrogen receptor. Am J Public Health 2013; 103:22-27. 
97. Heldring N, Pike A, Andersson S, Matthews J, Cheng G, Hartman J, Tujague M, Ström A, 
Trueter E, Warner M, Gustafsson J-Å. Estrogen receptors: how do they signal and what are their 
targets? Physiol Rev 2007; 87:905-931. 
98. Vrtačnik P, Ostanek B, Mencej-Bedrač S, More J. The many faces of estrogen signaling. Biochem 
Med (Zagreb) 2014; 24:329-342. 
99. Terris M. (ed). Goldberger on Pellagra. Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 
1964. 
100. Etheridge EW. The Butterfly Caste: A Social History of Pellagra in the South.  Westport, CT: 
Greenwood Publishing Co., 1972. 
101. Elmore JE, Feinstein AR. Joseph Goldberger: an unsung hero of American clinical epidemiology. 
Ann Intern Med 1994; 121:372-375. 
102. Klevay LM. And so spake Goldberger in 1916: pellagra is not infectious! J Am Coll Nutr 1997; 
16: 290-292. 
103. National Institutes of Health, Office of NIH History. Dr. Joseph Goldberger and the War on 
Pellagra. Available at: http://history.nih.gov/exhibits/goldberger/index.html ; accessed: March 23, 
2016. 
104. Lansha DJ. The discovery of niacin, biotin, and panthothenic acid. Ann Nutr Metabl 2012; 
61:246-253. 
105. Davenport CB. The hereditary factor in pellagra. Archives Intern Med 1916; 18:4-31. 
106. Goldberger J, Wheeler GA, Sullivan MX, Jones KK. The Experimental Production of Pellagra in 
Human Subjects by Means of Diet. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1920. 
107. Goldberger J, Wheeler GA, Lillie RD, Rogers LM. A study of the blacktongue-preventive action 
of 16 foodstuffs, with special reference to the identity of blacktongue of dogs and pellagra of 
man. Public Health Reports 1928; 43:1385-1454. 
108. Goldberger J, Wheeler GA, Sydenstricker E. A study of the relation of family income and other 
economic factors to pellagra incidence in seven cotton-mill villages of South Carolina in 1916. 
Public Health Reports 1920; 35:2673-2714. 
109. Goldberger J, Wheeler GA, Sydenstricker A. A study of the relation of diet to pellagra incidence 
in seven textile-mill communities of South Carolina in 1916. Public Health Reports 1920; 
35:648-713. 
110. Goldberger J, Sydenstricker E. Pellagra in the Mississippi Flood Area: report of an inquiry 
relating to the prevalence of pellagra in the area affected by the overflow of the Mississippi and 
its tributaries in Tennessee, Arkansas, Mississippi, and Louisiana in the spring of 1927. Public 
Health Reports 1927; 42:2706-2725. 
111. Ebrahim S. Yerushalmy and the problems of causal inference. Int J Epidemiol 2014; 43:1349-
1351. 
112. Parascandola M. Commentary: smoking, birthweight, and mortality: Jacob Yerushalmy on self-
selection and the pitfalls of causal inference. Int J Epidemiol 2014; 43:1373-1377. 
        27 
 
113. Yerushalmy J. The relationship of parents’ cigarette smoking to outcome of pregnancy – 
implications to the problem of inferring causation from an observed association. Am J Epidemiol 
1971; 93:443-456. (Reprinted Int J Epidemiol 2014; 43:1355-1366). 
114. VanderWeele TJ. Commentary: resolution of the birthweight paradox: competing explanations 
and analytical insights. Int J Epidemiol 2014; 43:1368-1373. 
115. Kramer MS, Zhang X, Platt RW. Commentary: Yerushalmy, maternal cigarette smoking and the 
perinatal mortality crossover. Int J Epidemiol 2014; 43:1378-1381. 
116. Hernández-Díaz S, Schisterman EF, Hérnan MA. The birth-weight paradox uncovered? Am J 
Epidemiol 2006; 164:1115-1120. 
117. VanderWeele TJ, Mumford SL, Schisterman EF. Conditioning on intermediates in perinatal 
epidemiology. Epidemiol 2012; 23:1-9. 
118. Keyes KM, Davey Smith G, Susser E. Commentary: smoking in pregnancy and offspring health: 
early insights into family-based and ‘negative-control’ studies? Int J Epidemiol 2014; 43:1381-
1388. 
119. Smith GD. Assessing intrauterine influences on offspring health outcomes: can epidemiological 
studies yield robust outcomes? Basic Clin Pharmacol Toxicol 2008; 102:245-256. 
120. Lowe CR. Effect of mothers’ smoking habits on birth weight of their children. Br Med J 1959; 
2:673-676. 
121. Kuja-Halkola R, D’Onofrio BM, Larsson H, Lichtenstein P. Maternal smoking during pregnancy 
and adverse outcomes in offspring: genetic and environmental sources of covariance. Behav 
Genet 2014; 44:456-467. 
122. Magnus P, Berg K, Bjerkedal T, Nance W. The heritability of smoking behavior in pregnancy, 
and the birth weights of offspring of smoking-discordant twins. Scand J Soc Med 1985; 13:29-34. 
123. Tyrell J, Huikari V, Christie JT, Cavadino A, Bakker R, Brion MJ, et al. Genetic variation in the 
15q25 nicotinic acetylcholine receptor gene cluster (CHRNA5-CHRNA3-CHRNB4) interacts 
with maternal self-reported smoking status during pregnancy to influence birth weight. Hum Mol 
Genet 2012; 21:5344-5358. 
124. Evans WN, Ringel JS. Can higher cigarette taxes improve birth outcomes? J Public Econ 1999; 
72:135-154. 
125. Hamilton BH. Estimating treatment effects in randomized clinical trials with non-compliance: the 
impact of maternal smoking on birthweight. Health Econ 2001; 10:399-410. 
126. Elderton M, Pearson K. A First Study of the Influence of Parental Alcoholism on the Physique 
and Ability of the Offspring. London; Dulau and Co., 1910. 
127. Pearson K, Elderton Em. A Second Study of the Influence of Parental Alcoholism on the Physique 
and Ability of the Offspring. London: Dulau and Co., 1910. 
128. Stigler SM. Karl Pearson and the Cambridge economists. In: Stigler SM. Statistics on the Table. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999; 13-50. 
129. Pigou AC. Westminster Gazette, Feb 2, 1911, pp. 1-2. 
130. Davey Smith G. Pigou, Pearson, and parental intemperance: debating “collider bias” in 1911. (in 
preparation). 
        28 
 
131. Berkson J. Limitations of the application of the fourfold table analysis to hospital data. Biomet 
Bull 1946; 2:47-53. 
132. Greenland S, Neutra RR. An analysis of detection bias and proposed corrections in the study of 
estrogens and endometrial cancer. J Chron Dis 1981; 34:433-438. 
133. Greenland S. Randomization, statistics, and causal inference. Epidemiol 1990; 1:421-429. 
134. Greenland S, Mansournia MA. Limitations of individual causal models, causal graphs, and 
ignorability assumptions, as illustrated by random confounding and design unfaithfulness. Eur J 
Epidemiol 2015; DOI: 10.1007/s10654-015-9995-7. 
135. Smith GD, Ebrahim S, Frankel S. How policy informs the evidence. BMJ 2001; 322:184. 
136. Krieger N, Alegría M, Almeida-Filho N, Barbosa da Silva J Jr, Barreto ML, Beckfield J, 
Berkman L, Birn A-E, Duncan BB, Franco S, Garcia DA, Gruskin S, James SA, Laurell AC, 
Schmidt MI, Walters KL. Who, and what, causes health inequities? Reflections on emerging 
debates from an exploratory Latin American/North American workshop. J Epidemiol Community 
Health 2010; 64:747-749. 
137. Krieger N. Discrimination and health inequities. In: Berkman L, Kawachi I, Glymour M (eds). 
Social Epidemiology. 2nd ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 2014; 63-125. 
138. Krieger N, Rowley D, Herman AA, Avery B, Phillips MT. Racism, sexism and social class: 
implications for studies of health, disease, and well-being. Am J Prev Med 1993; 9(6 suppl):82-
122. 
139. Gee GC, Ford CL. Structural racism and health inequities: old issues, new directions. Du Bois 
Rev 2011; 8:115-132. 
140. Williams DR. Miles to go before we sleep: racial inequities in health. J Health Soc Behav 2012; 
53:279-295. 
141. Metzl JM, Roberts DE. Structural competency meets structural racism: race, politics, and the 
structure of medical knowledge. Virtual Mentor: AMA J Ethics 2014; 16:675-690. 
142. VanderWeele TJ, Robinson WR. On the causal interpretation of race in regressions adjusting for 
confounding and mediating variables. Epidemiol 2014; 25:473-454. 
143. Russo F, Wunsch G, Mouchart M. Inferring causality through counterfactuals in observational 
studies – some epistemological issues. Bull Sociological Methodol 2011; 111:43-64. 
144. Greiner J, Rubin D. Causal effects of perceived immutable characteristics. Rev Ec Stat 2011; 
93:775-785. 
145. Sen M, Wasow O. Race as a “bundle of sticks”: designs that estimate effects of seeming 
immutable characteristics. Annual Rev Polit Sci 2016 (in press). 
146. Marks J. The nature/culture of genetic facts. Annu Rev Anthropol 2013; 42:247-267. 
147. Wailoo K, Nelson A, Lee C. Genetics and the Unsettled Past: The Collision of DNA, Race, and 
History. New Brunswick, NJ; Rutgers, 2012. 
148. Fujimora JH, Bolnick DA, Rajagopalan R, Kaufman JS, Lewontin RC, Duster T, Ossorio P, 
Marks J. Clines without classes: how to make sense of human variation. Social Theory 2014; 
32:208-227. 
149. Koenig B, Lee S, Richardson S (eds). Revisiting Race in a Genomic Age. New Brunswick, NJ: 
Rutgers University Press, 2008. 
        29 
 
150. Fullwiley D. The ‘contemporary synthesis’: when politically inclusive genomic science relies on 
biological notions of race. Isis 2014; 105:803-814. 
151. Weiss KM, Lang JC. Non-Darwinian estimation: my ancestors, my genes’ ancestors. Genome Res 
2009; 19:703-710. 
152. Bliss C. Defining health justice in the postgenomic era. In: Richardson SS, Hallam S (eds).  
Postgenomics: Perspectives on Biology after the Genome. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 
2015; 174-191. 
153. Frank R. Back to the future? the emergence of a geneticized conceptualization of race in 
sociology. Am Acad Pol Soc Sci 2015; 661:51-64. 
154. Krieger N. Re: “On the causal interpretation of race.” Epidemiol 2014; 25:937 
155. Smith JM. On the fourteenth query of Thomas Jefferson’s notes on Virginia. Anglo-African 
Magazine 1859; 1:225-228. 
156. Du Bois WEB. The Health and Physique of the Negro. Atlanta, GA: Atlanta University Press, 
1906. 
157. Fix ME, Struyk RJ. Clear and Convincing Evidence: Measurement of Discrimination in America. 
Washington, DC: Urban Institute Press, 1993. 
158. Blank RM, Dabady R, Citro CF (ed). Measuring Racial Discrimination. Washington, DC: 
National Research Council, National Academy Press, 2004. 
159. Reskin B. The race discrimination system. Annu Rev Sociol 2012; 38:17-35. 
160. Marcellisi A. Is race a cause? Phil Sci 2013; 80:650-659. 
161. Kaufman JS. Race: ritual, regression, and reality. Epidemiol 2014; 25:485-487. 
162. Yudell M. Race Unmasked: Biology and Race in the Twentieth Century. New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2014. 
163. Ernst W, Harris B (eds). Race, Science, and Medicine, 1700-1960. London: Routledge, 1999. 
164. Tilley H. Racial science, geopolitics, and empires: paradoxes of power. Isis 2014; 105:773-781. 
165. Anderson W. Racial conceptions in the Global South. Isis 2014; 105:782-792. 
166. Pascoe P. What Comes Naturally: Miscegenation  Law and the Making of Race in America. New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2009. 
167. Khanna N. “If you’re half-black, you’re just black”: reflected appraisals and the persistence of the 
one-drop rule. Sociol Q 2010; 51:96-121. 
168. Thorton R. Tribal membership requirements and the demography of ‘old’ and ‘new’ Native 
Americans. Pop Res Policy Rev 1997; 16:33-42. 
169. Romero M, Margolis E (eds). The Blackwell Companion to Social Inequalities. Malden, MA: 
Blackwell, 2005. 
170. Tilly C. Identities, Boundaries, and Social Ties. Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers, 2005. 
171. Chay KY, Greenstone M. The convergence in black-white infant mortality rates during the 
1960’s. Am Econ Rev. 2000;90:326–332. 
172.  Almond DV, Chay KY, Greenstone M. Civil Rights, the War on Poverty, and Black-White 
convergence in infant mortality in the rural South and Mississippi. 31 December 2006. MIT 
Economics Working Paper No. 07-04. Available at: 
        30 
 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=961021 ; accessed: March 23, 2016. 
173. Almond D, Chay KY. The long-run and intergenerational impact of poor infant health: evidence 
from cohorts born during the Civil Rights era. Working Paper. 2008. Available at: 
http://users.nber.org/~almond/chay_npc_paper.pdf ; accessed: March 23, 2016. 
174. Kaplan G, Ranjit N, Burgard S. Lifting gates, lengthening lives: did civil rights policies improve 
the health of African-American women in the 1960s and 1970s? In: Schoeni RF, House JS, 
Kaplan G, Pollack H, eds. Making Americans Healthier: Social and Economic Policy as Health 
Policy. New York, NY: Russell Sage Foundation, 2008; 145–170. 
175. Krieger N, Chen JT, Coull B, Waterman PD, Beckfield J. The unique impact of abolition of Jim 
Crow laws on reducing inequities in infant death rates and implications for choice of comparison 
groups in analyzing societal determinants of health. Am J Public Health. 2013; 103:2234–2244. 
176. Krieger N, Chen JT, Coull BA, Beckfield J, Kiang MV, Waterman PD.  Jim Crow and premature 
mortality among the US black and white population, 1960-2009: an age-period-cohort analysis. 
Epidemiol 2014; 25:494-504. 
177. Beckfield J, Krieger N. Epi + demos + cracy:  linking political systems and priorities to the 
magnitude of health inequities – evidence, gaps, and a research agenda. Epidemiol Review 2009; 
31:152-177. 
178. Thomas KK. Deluxe Jim Crow: Civil Rights and American Health Policy, 1935-1954. Athens, 
GA: University of Georgia Press, 2011. 
179. de Shazo RD, Smith R, Skipworth LB. Black physicians and the struggle for civil rights: lessons 
from the Mississippi experience. Part 1: the forces for and against change. Am J Med 2014; 
127:920-925. 
180. Dittmer J. The Good Doctors: The Medical Committee for Human Rights and the Struggle for 
Social Justice. New York: Bloomsbury, 2010. 
181. Oakes JM, Andrade KN. Methodological innovation and advances in social epidemiology. Curr 
Epidemiol Rep 2014; 1:38-44. 
182. Harper S, Strumpf EL. Commentary: social epidemiology: questionable answers and answerable 
questions. Epidemiol 2012; 23:795-798. 
183. Nandi A, Harper S. How consequential is social epidemiology. Curr Epi Reports 2014; 2:61-70. 
184. Krieger N. Epidemiology and the web of causation: has anyone seen the spider? Soc Sci Med 
1994; 39:887-903.  
185. Krieger N. Theories for social epidemiology in the 21st century: an ecosocial perspective. Int J 
Epidemiol 2001; 30:668-677. 
186. Peters BG. Strategies for comparative research in political science. Houndmills, UK: Palgrave 
MacMillan 2013.  
187. Rutherford GW, McFarland W, Spindler H, White K, Patel SV, Aberle-Grasse J, Sabin K, Smith 
N, Taché S, Calleja-Garcia JM, Stoneburner RL. Public health triangulation: approach and 
application to synthesizing data to understand national and local HIV epidemics. BMC Public 
Health 2010, 10:447. DOI: 10.1186/1471-2458-10-477 
188. Brion MJ, Lawlor DA, Matijasevich A, Horta B, Anselmi L, Araújo CL, Menezes AM, Victora 
CG, Smith GD. What are causal effects of breastfeeding on IQ, obesity and blood pressure? 
Evidence from comparing high-income with middle-income cohorts. Int J Epidemiol 2011; 
40:670-680. 
        31 
 
189. Krieger N, Kosheleva A, Waterman PD, Chen JT, Beckfield J, Kiang MV. 50-year trends in US 
socioeconomic inequalities in health: US-born black and white Americans, 1959-2008. Int J 
Epidemiol 2014; 43:1294-131. 
190. Chen JT, Beckfield J,Waterman PD, Krieger N. Can changes in the distribution of and 
associations between education and income bias temporal comparisons of health disparities? – an 
exploration with causal graphs and simulations. Am J Epidemiol 2013; 177:870-881. 
191. Ebi KL, Rocklöv J. Climate change and health modeling: horses for courses. Global Health 
Action 2014; 7:24154. http://dx.doi.org/10.3402/gha.v7.242154 
192. Klein N. This Changes Everything: Capitalism vs The Climate. New York: Simon & Schuster, 
2014. 
 
 
 
 
 
        32 
 
 
Table 1. Philosophical definitions of abduction, defeasible reasoning, and inference to the best explanation – and 
contrast to deductive reasoning and Bayesian confirmation theory. 
Abduction In contrast to deductive reasoning, in which the inferences are necessarily true if the premises are true, 
the reasoning involved in induction and abduction are both “ampliative, meaning that the conclusion goes 
beyond what is (logically) contained in the premises (which is why they are non-necessary inferences) … 
in abduction there is an implicit or explicit appeal to explanatory considerations ... in induction, there is 
only an appeal to observed to observed frequencies or statistics” [78]. 
 
“Abduction … assigns a confirmation-theoretic role to explanation: explanatory considerations 
contribute to making some hypotheses more credible, and others less so. By contrast, Bayesian 
confirmation theory makes no references at all to the concept of explanation” [78]. 
Defeasible 
reasoning 
“Reasoning is defeasible when the corresponding argument is rationally compelling but not deductively 
valid … the relationship of support between premises and conclusion is a tentative one, potentially 
defeated by additional information” [82].  
 
“Philosophers David M. Armstrong and Nancy Cartwright have argued that the actual laws of nature are 
oaken rather than iron (to use Armstrong’s terms). Oaken laws admit of exceptions: they have tacit 
ceteris paribus (other things being equal) or ceteris absentibus (other things being absent) conditions. As 
Cartwright points out, an inference based on such a law of nature is always defeasible, since we may 
discover additional phenomenological factors that must be added to the law in question … we know that 
there are many exceptional cases that we have not yet encountered and may not be able to imagine. 
Defeasible laws enable us to express what we really know to be the case, rather than force us to pretend 
that we can make an exhaustive list of all the possible exceptions … defeasible reasoning is crucial to the 
understanding of scientific research programs” [82].  
Inference 
to the best 
explanation 
“IBE is the mode of inference that proceeds as follows. 
 
           D is a collection of data (facts, observations) 
 
           H explains D. (H would, if true, explain D.) 
 
           No other hypothesis can explain D as well as H does. 
      ________________________________________________ 
 
          Therefore, H is (probably) true” [79, pp. 442-443].  
 
“Inference to the best explanation, or `abduction’ as it is sometimes called, can be seen as the extension 
of the idea of a self-evidencing explanation, where the phenomenon that is explained in turn provides an 
essential part of the reason for believing the explanation is correct … it is only by asking how well 
various hypotheses would explain the available evidence that we determine which hypotheses merit 
acceptance. In this sense, inference to the best explanation has it that explanation is prior to inference” 
[42, pp. 421-422]. 
 
Plausible candidates to distinguish the best explanation: “scope, precision, mechanism, unification and 
simplicity. Better explanations explain more types of phenomena, explain them with greater precision, 
provide more information about underlying mechanisms, unify apparently disparate phenomena, or 
simplify our overall picture of the world” [42, p. 423]. 
 
“According to the explanationist, explanatory considerations are a guide to inductive inference. We 
decide which of the competing hypotheses the evidence best supports by determining how well each of 
the competitors would explain the inference … Darwin inferred the hypothesis of natural selection 
because, although it was not entailed by his diverse biological evidence, natural selection would provide 
the best explanation of it” [42, p. 421]. 
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Textbox 1. Crookshank FG. First principles: and epidemiology. Proc Roy Soc Med 1919-1920; Sect Epidem, 
13:159-184. (italics in the original) [69]. 
pp. 178-179: “May I conclude by the brief narration of a fable? Several years ago, an ingenuous police surgeon, 
investigating what he was told was a case of murder, found a bullet in a heart. This he decided, and so told the 
coroner, was the causa vera, the causa causans, of the symptoms in this case of murder. Shortly after he went abroad 
to a war, and, honestly believing that war is but murder on a large scale, he investigated the appearances of many 
bodies; again finding bullets, he declared that bullets are the cause of war, as of murder. But, in not every fatal case 
was the bullet of the same kind. Moreover, the occasional absence of bullets disconcerted him until he realized that 
he had once found gas poisoning the causa vera, in a case of murder, and he therefore came to the conclusion that 
several wars here existed, side by side; each one sui generis, and boasting a different causa vera. He then proposed to 
end war by discharging other and like bullets and gases in a contrary direction, and found many who approved his 
plan as sensible. However, some pestilent and philosophic person told him that war was not the mere numerical 
exaggeration of cases of murder, brought about either by an exaltation in the virulence of bullets or gas, or by a 
diminution in resistance to these agencies: it was our name for a state of affairs that we conceive as brought about by 
the play and interplay of racial, economic, and other factors. He was told, moreover, that while undoubtedly various 
kinds of killing are elements of war as, conceived by the historian and statesman, wars are not to be prevented, as he 
hoped, by avoiding persons who, in tramcars and in cinemas, carry bullets, or who project poisonous gas in public 
places. He was, however, unconvinced, and returned to England more settled than ever that the causal agents of war 
are bullets (of various kinds, no doubt) and gases (of various toxicities, certainly), while the best hope of preventing 
war in future lies, not in talk about vague racial, economic, or political conditions (which can only, he thought, at most 
be predisposing), but in devising some means of circumventing the causae causantes, bullets and gas!” 
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Textbox 2: Inference to the Best Explanation – an exposition of Semmelweis’s research programe by Peter 
Lipton (excerpted from Chapter 5, Contrastive inference, pp. 71-90) [42]. 
 
1) The framing of contrastive explanations: “facts vs foils” 
 
p. 33: “What gets explained is not simply `Why this?,’ but ‘Why this rather than that?’ A contrastive phenomenon 
consists of a fact and a foil, and the same fact may have several different foils. We may not explain why the leaves 
turn yellow in November simpliciter, but only for example why they turn yellow in November rather than in January, 
or why they turn yellow in November rather than blue.” 
 
p. 34: “Since the causes that explain a fact relative to one foil will not generally explain it relative to another, the 
contrastive question provides further restriction on explanatory causes.” 
 
pp. 36-37: “One reason that explaining a contrast is sometimes harder than explaining the fact alone is that explaining 
a contrast requires giving causal information that distinguishes the fact from the foil, and information that we accept 
as an explanation of the fact alone may not do this, since it may not include information about the foil.” 
 
2) The example of Semmelweis and explaining childbed fever 
 
p.74: “To develop these arguments and, more generally, to show just how inferences to contrastive explanations 
work, it is useful to consider a simple but actual scientific example in some detail. The example I have chosen is Ignanz 
Semmelweis’s research from 1844-8 on childbed fever … Semmelweis’s central datum was that a much higher 
percentage of the women in the First Maternity Division of the hospital contracted the disease than in the adjacent 
Second Division, and Semmelweis sought to explain this difference.” 
 
p. 74:  First set of hypotheses: did not mark the difference (e.g., “epidemic influence,” since affected everyone, and no 
difference in crowding or diet while at the hospital) and so were rejected 
 
pp. 74-75:  Second set of hypotheses: did mark a difference, but did not explain it (e.g., only medical students in 
training treated women in the First Division and only midwives treated women in the Second Division, but both 
performed similar kinds of examinations, and no exams were rougher than childbirth, ruling out roughness of exam as 
a factor) 
 
p. 75: Third set of hypotheses: did mark a difference, but if difference eliminated, still no effect on difference in rates 
(e.g., priest who delivered last rites to dying women had to pass through the First but not Second Division, suggesting 
that “the psychological influence of seeing the priest might explain the difference” (!),  but ruled out after 
Semmelweis had the priest change his route and not be seen by women in either Division; also, women in First 
Division delivered on their backs and women in Second Division delivered on their sides, but mortality differences 
remained the same after Semmelweis arranged for all women to deliver on their sides) 
 
p. 75: Final set of hypotheses: marked a difference and elimination of difference eliminated difference in mortality 
rates (“Kolletschka, one of Semmelweis’ colleagues, received a puncture wound in his finger during an autopsy, and 
died from an illness with symptoms like those of childbed fever. This led Semmelweis to infer that Kolletschak’s death 
was due to the `cadaveric matter’ that the wound introduced into his own blood stream, and Semmelweis then 
hypothesized that the same explanation would account for deaths in the First Division, since medical students 
performed their examinations directly after performing autopsies, and midwives did not perform autopsies at all. 
Similarly, the cadaveric hypothesis would explain why women who delivered outside the hospital had a lower 
mortality from childbed fever, since they were not examined. Semmelweis had the medical students disinfect their 
hands before examination, and the mortality rate in the First Division went down to the same low level as that in the 
Second Division. Here at last was a difference that made a difference, and Semmelweis inferred the cadaveric 
hypothesis.”) 
 
Why illustration of Inference to the Best Explanation (and contrary to “hypothetico-deductive” approach):  
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pp. 75-76: first and second set of hypotheses rejected because although compatible with the evidence (i.e., could still 
be part of contributing to deaths in the First or Second Division), they could not explain the contrast between the two 
Divisions, nor could they explain differences observed when the “foil” changed (e.g., ‘epidemic influence’ could not 
explain why rates were higher among women in First Division as compared to women outside of the hospital) 
 
p. 79: no expectation that the “cadaveric hypothesis” would explain ALL cases (since some women delivered by the 
midwives also contracted childbed fever, but the midwives had not conducted autopsies), only that it DID explain the 
difference between the two Divisions, a difference eliminated by disinfection after autopsy – hence “cadaveric 
hypothesis” incomplete, but not incorrect. 
 
p. 80: by contrast, exposure to priest and delivery on back vs. side shown to be not only incomplete but also incorrect 
(since changing exposure to each made no difference to difference in mortality rates between the Divisions) 
 
p. 81: additional “unifying” aspects of “cadaveric” hypothesis: explained both deaths of women due to childbed fever 
and death of the colleague, and also lower rates of mortality in women who delivered at home versus in the hospital 
(different foil) 
 
p. 81: ‘By tailoring his explanatory interests (and his observational and experimental procedures) to contrasts that 
would help discriminate between competing hypotheses, Semmelweis was able to judge which hypotheses would 
provide the best overall explanation of the wide variety of contrasts (and absences of contrast) he observed, and so 
judge which hypothesis he ought to infer. Semmelweis’s inferential interests determined his explanatory interests, 
and the best explanation then determined his inference.” 
 
pp. 82-86: Moreover, “Inference to Best Explanation” provides a better explanation of the route to inference than the 
“hypothetico-deductive method” (which rejects all inductive logic) because; (a) the latter does not provide a place to 
begin (conjectural hypotheses are typically framed as “happy guesses”), in contrast to the clear contrastive foils used 
in the IBE approach; (b) Semmelweis rejected hypotheses (e.g., “epidemic influences,” overcrowding) that 
nevertheless did not outright contradict his hypothesis and were logically compatible with it; and (c) Semmelweis 
accepted a hypotheses he recognized was incomplete (some women in the Second Division did die of childbed fever) 
but nevertheless was correct in accounting for the difference in mortality between the two Divisions. 
 
p. 90: “ … as the example shows, Inference to the Best Explanation supports a picture of research that is at once more 
active and realistic, where explanatory considerations guide the program of observation and experiment, as well as of 
conjecture. The upshot of this program is inference to the loveliest explanation but the technique is eliminative. 
Through the use of judiciously chosen experiments, Semmelweis determined the loveliest explanation by a process of 
manipulation and elimination that left only a single explanation of salient contrasts. in effect, Semmelweis converted 
the question of the loveliest explanation of non-contrastive facts into the question of the only explanation of various 
contrasts. Research programmes that make this conversion are common in science, and it is one of the merits of 
Inference to the Best Explanation that it elucidates this strategy.” 
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Textbox 3. Triangulation and inference to the best explanation: the example of smoking and low birthweight. 
Maternal smoking during pregnancy has been associated with offspring birthweight for many decades [120], but – as 
with smoking and other health outcomes – the causal nature of this association was disputed. Here we are not 
reviewing the (interesting) history of this debate, rather we document how findings from various approaches to 
strengthening causal inference can be triangulated to produce an overall evidence base that is considerably more 
robust than that from any individual study alone [5,119].   
1) Observational studies 
A large number of observational studies have demonstrated that maternal smoking during pregnancy is associated 
with birthweight of offspring.  
2) Cross-contextual comparisons  
 
Observational studies that have been carried out in different contexts – where the confounding of maternal smoking 
with socioeconomic position and related factors differ, and those that are adequately powered consistently 
demonstrate the same direction and approximate magnitude of association. 
 
3) Negative control studies 
 
Negative control studies utilising paternal smoking as a factor that may be associated with confounders to the same 
degree as maternal smoking, but cannot have the same magnitude of a direct intrauterine effect, demonstrate 
considerably larger associations of maternal than paternal smoking with offspring birthweight [119]. A second 
negative control – maternal smoking either before or after pregnancy but not during pregnancy – does not relate to 
offspring birthweight to the same extent as maternal smoking during pregnancy. 
 
4) Within-sibship studies 
 
Studying mothers who smoked during at least one pregnancy, and did not smoke during at least one other pregnancy, 
find on-average birthweight differences between the offspring born following maternal smoking and their siblings 
who were not exposed to antenatal smoke [121].  
 
5) Children of twins 
 
Offspring of female monozygotic twin pairs in which one mother smokes and the other does not smoke finds lower 
birthweight for the offspring of the former [122].    
 
6) Mendelian randomization (MR) 
 
A genetic variant which relates to heavier smoking carried by mothers is associated with lower birth weight of 
offspring. This association is limited to mothers who smoke, strongly suggesting that the effect of the variant is due to 
its influence on maternal smoking [123]. MR can be conceptualised within the instrumental variables (IV) framework. 
An IV is a measure that relates to the exposure of interest and is only related to the outcome of interest through this 
association (i.e. the IV is not associated with confounding factors and the IV has no direct influence on the outcome). 
 
7) Non-genetic IVs 
 
Other non-genetic IVs for maternal smoking behavior can be used. Thus a study utilized different levels of cigarette 
taxes across US states, which influence smoking levels, and demonstrated a birthweight-lowering effect of smoking 
[124].   
 
8) Randomized controlled trials (RCTs) 
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In RCTs a group of mothers who are smoking before or during pregnancy are randomized to an intervention aimed at 
reducing smoking. Evidence that such an intervention leads to higher birthweight among offspring of the mothers 
randomized to the intervention has been seen [125].    
 
Method Strengths in comparison to 
conventional observational analysis 
Key assumptions                                     
 
Observational studies Not applicable No unmeasured confounders; no 
measurement error in assessed 
confounders; correctly specified model 
(this assumption relates to all methods to 
a greater or lesser degree) 
Cross-contextual comparisons Will reveal context-specific 
confounding 
No unmeasured confounding which 
(unlike the assessed confounders) is 
similar in magnitude between contexts 
and contributes substantially to the 
observed associations 
Negative control studies Reveals existence of potential 
unmeasured confounding.  
Negative control is associated with the 
exposure (or outcome) to the same extent 
as the exposure (or outcome) of interest. 
Within-sibship studies Robust to fixed maternal effects that 
could confound the association. 
The important confounders do not change 
between pregnancies in a manner that is 
associated with change in maternal 
smoking behavior. 
Children of twins Between-MZ maternal twin pair 
analysis not subject to genetic 
confounding, or confounding by 
other factors that are shared 
between monozygotic twins. 
Comparison of between-MZ and 
between-DZ twin analyses allows 
estimation of extent of genetic 
confounding. 
No unmeasured confounding by factors 
that differ between twins. 
Mendelian randomization (MR) No systematic confounding. No pleiotropic effect of the genetic 
variants that influence the outcome 
independent of the exposure of interest. 
Non-genetic IVs No systematic confounding. The instrumental variable does not relate 
to confounding factors and does not 
impact on the outcome except through 
the exposure of interest. 
Randomized controlled trials 
(RCTs) 
Randomization leads to no 
systematic confounding. 
The intervention does not have effects 
except through changes in the exposure of 
interest. 
 
The above is a non-exhaustive list of study designs that can contribute to triangulation of evidence. Whilst the findings 
of all study types can be biased, as can be seen above the source of potential bias is different across the study types, 
and will not associate in such a manner that possible biases would all point in the same direction (and with the same 
magnitude of effect) to produce the same misleading causal inference. 
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Textbox 4. Alternative conceptualizations of causal relationships: “race” vs racism and health. 
1) Counterfactual reasoning that “race” cannot be a cause: epidemiological and social science claims 
 Glass TA, Goodman SN, Hernán MA, Samet JM. Causal inference in public health. Annu Rev Public Health 2013; 
34:61-75. [1] 
“Although the potential outcomes approach is robust in the context of a range of causal questions of high value to 
public health, its use raises some questions. For example, should we consider causal questions about inherent 
features of individuals (such as sex, race/ethnicity, or age) that cannot be reasonably translated into hypothetical 
interventions?” [p. 70] 
 VanderWeele TJ, Whitney WR. On the causal interpretation of race in regressions adjusting for confounding and 
mediating variables. Am J Epidemiol 2014; 25:473-454. [142] 
“Part of the challenge of interpreting race coefficients causally is that, in the formal causal inference literature, 
effects are often defined in terms of counterfactual or potential outcomes, which are defined as the outcomes that 
would result under hypothetical interventions. There are, however, no reasonable hypothetical interventions on 
race when race itself is the exposure.” [p. 473] 
“Our discussion has focused on differences in outcomes across racial groups … A similar approach might be used 
with other non-manipulable exposures such as sex.” [p. 480] 
 VanderWeele TJ, Hernán MA. Causal effects and natural laws: towards a conceptualization of causal 
counterfactuals for nonmanipulable exposures, with application to the effects of race and sex. In: Berzuini C, Dawid 
P, Bernardinelli L (eds). Causality: Statistical Perspectives and Applications. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd, 2012; 
101-113. [34]   
“Although we believe that counterfactuals related to manipulable quantities are of primary interest for policy 
purposes, causation related to nonmanipulable quantities can be of scientific interest and arguably constitute a 
substantial portion of instances of causation in science. We consider what this approach to conceptualizing causal 
effects might contribute to discussion of the effects of sex and race.” [p. 102] 
 Russo F, Wunsch G, Mouchart M. Inferring causality through counterfactuals in observational studies – some 
epistemological issues. Bull Sociological Methodol 2011; 111:43-64. [143] 
“ … attributes (such as sex or ethnicity) could indeed be considered as causes of effects, even though they cannot 
be manipulated physically or mentally.” [p. 54] 
 Greiner J, Rubin D. Causal effects of perceived immutable characteristics. Rev Ec Stat 2011; 93:775-785. [144] 
“The emphasis on manipulation has led some scholars (Holland, 1986a; Winship & Sobel, 1999; Freedman, 2004; 
Berk, 2004) to contend that it is inappropriate to conceptualize a person’s actual race, sex, or national origin as a 
treatment in an observational study. Holland (2003) in particular distinguishes `properties’ or `attributes,’ such as 
race and sex, from ‘causes,’ such as a pill.  The objection to studying causal effects of attributes has two aspects. 
Fist, attributes are not subject to change by intervention. Second, some properties (including immutable 
characteristics) are determined at a person’s conception, and thus almost all measurable variables specific to the 
unit are post treatment.: `For example, because I am a White person, it would be close to ridiculous to ask what 
would have happened to me had I been black’ (Holland, 2003).” [p. 776] 
“A shift in focus from `true’ immutable characteristics to perceptions does not mean that any and all inquiries into 
the effect of race, sex, and so on are well defined, even those involving some aspects of randomization. Several 
limits are particularly important. First, if treatments are perceptions, then someone must be perceiving 
something.” [p. 783] 
 
2) Alternative conceptual framing of racism as a determinant of population health and health inequities 
 Krieger N. Discrimination and health inequities. In: Berkman L, Kawachi I, Glymour M (eds). Social Epidemiology. 
2nd ed. New York: Oxford, 2014; 63-125. [137] 
“To guide both the research questions posed and the methods used, ecosocial theory posits … that inequitable 
race relations simultaneously—and not sequentially: (a) benefit the groups who claim racial superiority at the 
expense of those whom they deem intrinsically inferior, (b) racialize biology to produce and justify the very 
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categories used to demarcate racial/ethnic groups, and (c) generate inequitable living and working conditions that, 
via embodiment, result in the biological expression of racism—and hence racial/ethnic health inequities. A 
corollary is that there are many pathways, not just one, by which discrimination could harm health.” [p. 74] 
 Gee GC, Ford Cl. Structural racism and health inequities: old issues, new directions. Du Bois Rev 2011; 8:115-132. 
[139] 
“Racial minorities bear a disproportionate burden of morbidity and mortality. These inequities might be explained 
by racism, given the fact that racism has restricted the lives of racial minorities and immigrants throughout history. 
Recent studies have documented that individuals who report experiencing racism have greater rates of illnesses. 
While this body of research has been invaluable in advancing knowledge on health inequities, it still locates the 
experiences of racism at the individual level. Yet, the health of social groups is likely most strongly affected by 
structural, rather than individual, phenomena. The structural forms of racism and their relationship to health 
inequities remain under-studied. This article reviews several ways of conceptualizing structural racism, with a focus 
on social segregation, immigration policy, and intergenerational effects. Studies of disparities should more 
seriously consider the multiple dimensions of structural racism as fundamental causes of health disparities.” [p. 
115]  
 Williams DR. Miles to go before we sleep: racial inequities in health. J Health Soc Behav 2012; 53:279-295. [140] 
“Large, pervasive, and persistent racial inequalities exist in the onset, courses, and outcomes of illness. A 
comprehensive understanding of the patterning of racial disparities indicates that racism in both its institutional 
and individual forms remains an important determinant. There is an urgent need to build the science base that 
would identify how to trigger the conditions that would facilitate needed societal change and to identify the 
optimal interventions that would confront and dismantle the societal conditions that create and sustain health 
inequalities.” [p. 279]  
 Metzl JM, Roberts DE. Structural competency meets structural racism: race, politics, and the structure of medical 
knowledge. Virtual Mentor: AMA J Ethics 2014; 16:675-690. [141] 
“ Physicians in the United States have long been trained to assess race and ethnicity in the context of clinical 
interactions. Medical students learn to identify how their patients’ “demographic and cultural factors” influence 
their health behaviors. Interns and residents receive “cultural competency” training to help them communicate 
with persons of differing “ethnic” backgrounds. And clinicians are taught to observe the races of their patients and 
to dictate these observations into medical records—“Mr. Smith is a 45-year-old African American man”—as a 
matter of course.  
To be sure, attention to matters of diversity in clinical settings has been shown to affect a number of factors 
central to effective diagnosis and treatment. Yet an emerging educational movement challenges the basic premise 
that having a culturally competent or sensitive clinician reduces patients’ overall experience of stigma or improves 
health outcomes. This movement, called “structural competency,” contends that many health-related factors 
previously attributed to culture or ethnicity also represent the downstream consequences of decisions about 
larger structural contexts, including health care and food delivery systems, zoning laws, local politics, urban and 
rural infrastructures, structural racisms, or even the very definitions of illness and health. Locating medical 
approaches to racial diversity solely in the bodies, backgrounds, or attitudes of patients and doctors, therefore, 
leaves practitioners unprepared to address the biological, socioeconomic, and racial impacts of upstream decisions 
on structural factors such as expanding health and wealth disparities.” [p. 674] 
 
 
